INTRODUCTION
In March of 2015, Scientific American estimated that the number of people worldwide who will be affected by flooding from rainfall each year will Fall 2015] Surface Water Liability 75 rise to 54 million per year by 2030. 1 Researchers at the World Resources Institute estimate that flooding currently costs around $96 billion in gross domestic product worldwide; in 2030, that number rises to $520 billion per year. 2 The problem is not just extreme rain or snowfall. The rapid expansion of urban areas, combined with extreme precipitation, doubles flood risks. 3 These new risks arise not from swelling rivers and lakes, but from stormwater runoff. Urban construction, including changes to elevations of lots, paving, and building prevent natural absorption of water and channel it into lower-lying areas.
Because flooding is the most frequent natural catastrophe, 4 the topics of flooding and sea level rise have dominated discussions about water and climate change. Surface water, on the other hand, has been neglected. We have ranked these concerns entirely backwards.
The World Bank, which has cited urban flood risk management as a major future concern, specifically cautions against thinking in terms of sea level rise. The World Bank instead warns that more coastal cities risk flooding from poor management of surface water than from rising sea levels. 5 Meanwhile, legal scholars have failed to engage the jurisprudence of surface water liability, which governs when a landowner is responsible for increasing the flow of water to a neighboring parcel of land. 6 Generally, landowners increase the flow on a neighboring parcel either inadvertently, 2.
Id.
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Id.
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The World Bank, Development Dialogue: Urban Flood Risk Management, STRIKING POVERTY, http://strikingpoverty.worldbank.org/conversations/development-dialogue-urbanflood-risk-management (last visited Aug. 28, 2015).
5.
Id.
6.
Only a few articles directly focus on liability for surface water and each dates to several decades ago. See generally Donald V. Dobbins, Surface Water Drainage, 36 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 518 (1960 REV. 518 ( -1961 
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[Vol. 5:1 through construction, or intentionally in an effort to protect their own land from flooding. Multiplying the scale of future urban flooding by damages and business losses means that surface water liability shows all the signs of being an enormous source of litigation in the coming decades.
Surface water jurisprudence is badly situated for this influx of cases. In the vast majority of jurisdictions, the law of surface waters remains cumbersome and antiquated. Perhaps worse, it is simply confusing to attorneys, clients, and courts.
Surface water cases form an endless mire of both torts and property law. 7 Surface water liability relies on causes of action from nuisance to intentional tort to negligence to trespass. 8 Defenses also come from both fields of law and include acts of god 9 and easements. As the Indiana Supreme Court has observed, while the basic rules of surface water "are grounded upon real property concepts [,] [t]he modifications engrafted upon them resulted from the use of tort law concepts [.] " 10 Inevitably, courts struggle with this fuzziness.
This Article critiques the surface water liability rules incorporated across most jurisdictions in the United States through original research into the agricultural science that supported these legal doctrines. By demonstrating how the legal doctrines emerged from agricultural science that we now know is not only highly flawed, but also detrimental to the common wellbeing, this Article demonstrates the need to break with past doctrines and engage in a genuine rethinking of how to manage surface water liability in the twenty-first century.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces original research into the agricultural science that supported the surface water liability rules Those (Nov. 18, 2013) , http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/18/natural-disasters-or-acts-of-god/humans-can-predict-and-affect-what-once-were-acts-of-god (discussing the "Acts of God" defense).
10. Argyelan v. Haviland, 435 N.E.2d 973, 975-76 (Ind. 1982).
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Surface Water Liability 77 adopted across the United States. This part contextualizes the evolution of land improvement and drainage philosophy in the United States by grounding it in the agricultural science of the time. Part II presents the basics of the surface water liability doctrine, explaining how surface waters are defined, how multiple causes of action are used to pursue surface water damages, and how the major rules for surface water have evolved. This part will pay particular attention to how doctrines evolved to support land management strategies of drainage and improvement.
Finally, Part III will assess the current state of surface water rules and examine how judicial applications of these doctrines continue to incorporate the original foundations in eighteenth century agricultural science. The Article further investigates the impact of these doctrines on land development, concluding that modern surface water liability expresses multiple preferences for development over non-development of land. This continued preference for development contributes to climate change by supporting the destruction of natural carbon sequestration devices, and it increases the vulnerability of populations to the effects of climate change by reducing natural landscapes that provide buffers against storms and mitigate effects of both sea level rise and flooding. The Article concludes by calling for a reexamination of surface water liability within legislatures and suggesting a new approach that would be more consistent with modern theories of tort and property liability, as well as more sustainable. 12. This Article discusses ideologies of land management that were present in England and Wales prior to the Acts of Union with Scotland in 1707, as well as those present in England, Scotland and Wales (and the colonies) after 1707. Given that the primary focus of this Article is the policies as they were incorporated within the North American colonies 78 
I. THE AGRICULTURAL SCIENCE BEHIND SURFACE WATER JURISPRUDENCE
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[Vol. 5:1 colonization process in North America. The following sections provide some context by illuminating social and political pressures for drainage, political support for such projects, and, most importantly, the agricultural science that supported the British attitude toward drainage.
I have chosen to constrain and manage the task of engaging with the historical mindset 13 by elaborating a narrow history of land drainage philosophy that converges neatly with the case study of surface water liability. Additionally, I have incorporated small portions of primary sources throughout that allow the reader to directly experience the flavor of contemporaneous writings.
A. British Attitudes Toward Land Management
British attitudes toward wetlands might be described as a bit of superstition, a bit of science, and a smattering of politics. In the following subsections I explain how attitudes towards wetlands emerged from a long history of both rational and irrational fears about swamps-from legends of ghosts and witches to the dangers of navigating a bog on foot. Additionally, wetlands provided little to no economic return, adding frustration to fear. Culturally, one might say that the British were predestined to loathe wetlands. Building on this foundation, I explain how the agricultural science of the era neatly proposed an answer to this loathing: drain the wetlands, creating new flat land for planting. As technologies for drainage expanded and labor costs decreased with population pressure, drainage became more widely available. As availability increased, so did pressure on landowners from multiple sources: economic, political, and religious. In the third subsection I explain how these forces worked together to push drainage on landowners. Finally, in the last subsection I discuss the responses of the landowning British to these pressures.
after 1707, for ease of reference I have adopted the term "British" rather than alternating between "English," "Welsh," and "British."
13. Admittedly, grasping the historical context can be a challenge for the modern mind. Professor Sax has eloquently explained the contrast between the modern environmental mindset and the one that predominated as economically challenging it would be to make former swampland profitable for long enough to offset the costs of drainage. Understanding the British mindset requires knowledge of the evolution of agricultural science.
As of the mid-1600s, British farmers did not know what water, air, soil, or sunlight contributed to make plants grow. 23 They wondered "whether all things are nourished by Vapors, Fumes, Atoms, Effluvia?" 24 Just over a hundred years later, in 1757, the musings hardly differed. Writers wondered whether nutrients for plants came from "juices" in the earth or, instead, if they were "furnished by the air, and put into action by the sun."
25 Farmers practiced historic techniques but held little knowledge on the specifics of how and why some plantings succeeded while others failed.
One experiment cited for years in the literature of agriculture and husbandry encouraged British readers to conclude that soil was less important in the success of plantings than other factors. The experiment involved placing a seedling weighing five pounds into a segregated portion of 200 pounds of earth. 26 The tree received water and sunlight; no soil or fertilizers were added or removed. After five years, the tree weighed 169 pounds, three ounces; the soil diminished only two ounces. 27 The experimenter concluded that "the vegetable nourishment is principally in the air."
28 Soils, for their part, would "imbibe certain qualities from the air."
29 Daniel Carless Webb argued that "enclosing land will in a degree assist vegetation, by preventing the winds from carrying away those fertile juices, which are the chief support of plants;" otherwise " [w] 34 Writers wrestled over the benefits of air and water, but few saw importance in soil itself as more than a supporting structure for the roots.
The introduction of fertilizers into the soil-a common practice at the time-did not depend on a belief that the soil fed plants. As one writer observed: "[I]f the earth alone was the food of the plants, it would in all cases produce the same effect." 35 Instead, planters often viewed fertilizers as changing the temperature of the soil rather than injecting any necessary nutrient. Thus, Mills could say, "[I]t is a great folly to dung grounds which require cooling, as it would be to administer poison, to cure a man of a fever."
36 Similarly, the burning of land did not support husbandry by introducing ash or minerals to the soil, but rather by the "heat of the fire warming the Land [which] wastes the Acid, sterile juices, that hinder the fertility of it[.]"
37
What then was the purpose of soil? Lord Bacon concluded "the earth doth but keep the plant upright, and save it from over-heat and overcold."
38 Soils were only problematic when they did not "afford sufficient stability to the plants" or were unable to "retain moisture enough to convey them their necessary food." 39 Thus, for example "[m]eer sand is too easily divested of its moisture and nutritive parts, which, on the other hand, are too closely locked up in clay." 40 Managing for temperature, air, and water, then, "[g]rounds . . . as simple Clays, Sands, or Gravels, together may be all good, and all fit to bring forth increase; or all evil and barren, and unfit for profit [.] " 41 The content of the soil mattered as a background: maintaining temperature, conducting air and water, and supporting stability.
32.
33.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 34.
Id. at 11.
35.
36.
Id [Vol. 5:1 Believing in the science of the day, British landowners were convinced that "[t]he river swamp lands, by proper culture and judicious management, are of inexhaustible fertility." 42 The best soils were those "most exposed to the influences of the sun and air," which suggested drainage as a method of exposing more soil to those proper influences. 43 When faced with marshy land, "the remedy is easy, by making proper drains to carry off the superfluous moisture." 44 Adopting drainage made so much sense to writers of the era that they felt pressured to explain why the marshlands had not been drained previously. Most writers answered by citing the lack of scientific knowledge in earlier eras. As John Smith described in 1798, "Our forefathers, ignorant of the art or advantage of draining, pitched not upon the best, but upon the driest fields. If the plain was too wet to admit the plough they passed by it . . . ." 47 Similarly, Alexander Hewatt, writing in 1779, explained that swamps had been "carefully avoided" because "[h]itherto the planters remained utter strangers to the value and fertility of the lowlands [ [H]ow picturesque the description of the waste from whence arose an Eden. 50 The improvement of lands "tend[ed] to no less an object than the augmentation of real national wealth." 51 Draining lands essentially allowed a process of internal colonization, "a new acquisition of territories" within the country by creating new arable acres from previously waterlogged land.
52
When farmers drained lands that had been under water, they supported the Crown and the national interest by increasing the tax base via increasing the number of arable acres. Additionally, British landowners strongly believed that "an industrious tilling and improving of Lands, [was] a principal means to beget and support a Trade[.]" 53 Additional arable acres meant additional crops such as flax and wheat that could augment what we would now call the gross domestic product. When landowners embarked on new cultivations upon the wastelands, those lands could become a "great advantage to the proprietors, besides being an ornament and real use to the country."
54
If draining vast sections of land could create more arable acres, then it was possible to claim that rather than having a population problem, "England [was] thinly inhabited."
55 Writers speculated that if the "moors, des[e]rts, and commons" were cultivated, then "there could be little doubt of its maintaining two millions of more people than at present [.] " 56 Increasing the number of arable acres within the country would solve problems of poverty and increasing population, which could at any time become a threat to the ruling powers. Thus, Arthur Young mused, "I know not so melancholy a reflection, as the idea of such waste and uncultivated lands being so common in a kingdom that loudly complains of the want of bread." 57 A simple solution presented itself, not only for the landowner, but for the kingdom; new arable lands meant that "bread and beef will be plentiful." 
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[Vol. 5:1 lands were in fact a chief cause of "wandering poor" in England. 59 Therefore, developing new arable lands would limit political unrest and "prove of advantage to the poor in general, by employing them in profitable and healthful exercises." 60 Indeed, draining to combat poverty ignited the agricultural fantasies of those who wrote about it: "[W]hat an immense number of souls might be kept upon the extra produce which this land is capable of producing, by Draining alone!" 61 There was no reason to leave a salt marsh as it was. While "so many are calling out for bread to eat . . . it surely behooves any man who loves his country" to pursue improvement. 62 Drainage and improvement fulfilled political, economic, and social obligations of landowners. Writers of pamphlets and books encouraged drainage, citing as their own motivations "Publique-heartednesse and great Zeal for the Common good."
63 Draining in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries went beyond a popular approach to land management to become a moral obligation of sorts for the betterment of England, the feeding of the poor, and the economic success of the nation.
These socio-political strains of thought intertwined with a religious approach to labor and work ethic. As Laura Brace has written, "[f]or the improvers, the notion of improvement was fundamental to God's intentions for the earth and for mankind." 64 Man failed in his duty where "the broad lines of nature remain[ed] unobliterated."
65 Cultivation, along with its many indicators of hard work meant that the British had found favor with God. 66 Accordingly, drainage and the creation of new arable acres provided even greater evidence of labor and divine favor.
The British colonization efforts reflect these religious and economic themes of drainage and document the export of the British attitudes to new lands. British colonists believed that old countries, long settled by Europeans, had "fewer stagnations of water, no swamps," and therefore, " [ With science, religion, politics, and folk culture all pushing landowners to eliminate wetlands, British agrarians unsurprisingly adopted drainage with fervor as soon as drainage became reasonably technologically and financially feasible. Drainage provided a logical way to expand estates and enhance profits. The only questions were how to do it and how much it would cost. While some drainage happened early, much of it waited for new technologies and lower labor costs. 72 As time went on, however, the expense of drainage remained significant. As a result, when population pressures rose in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the government explored ways of incentivizing drainage without state expenditures. Rather than making direct investments themselves, monarchs encouraged drainage by 67 
[Vol. 5:1 making land grants contingent upon undertaking the work.
73 Additional incentives included tithe relief for seven years following the conversion of wetlands to arable land. 74 Despite the costs, as populations continued to rise, drainage became even more common. One indicator of this trend is the explosion of literature on the topic. By the mid-eighteenth century, instructions for improvement and drainage became its own genre within British publishing. Books explained how to drain lands depending on their type and proximity to the sea or other waterways. 75 Literature of this period speaks with a religious zeal of the potential of improvement and drainage projects, which could take lands that were filled with standing brackish water, and " [through] Whether or not such drainage projects were actually profitable, or simply fervently imagined to be so, remains a question. Surely the answer differs depending on the type of wetland drained, the type of soil found beneath, and other measures taken such as the introduction of fertilizers.
Some sources suggest successful endeavors in draining and improvement, although often without detailing the types of landscapes or the acreage. For example, a statute in the year 1765 proclaimed that lands that "have been of late years improved or drained . . . are now of very considerable annual value." 18 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 71, at 267. More often, the historian finds sources that speculate as to the potential profits that may be garnered, but not evidence of actual accomplishments. For examples of such writings, see HAR-TLIB, supra note 63, at 4 (speculating that lands would increase 1400 times their value within seven years) and YOUNG, supra note 57, at 47-48 (providing a four year plan of investments, with growth each year and concluding that "[i]n this method . . . [the land] would make a considerable figure").
Other evidence, however, suggests that successful drainages were not possible. First, without steam power, the draining of wetlands created a massive operation of manual labor and complicated engineering. See ORWIN, supra note 15, at 15-19. The tools of drainage were "plow, spades, scoops, shovels, and forks." LEYBOURN, supra note 45, at 130. Not all contemporaries were convinced about the successful prospects of drainage. John Flavel favored improvement of lands generally, but when it came to those "miry ground [s] , where the water stands," he found that there was "no way to cleanse it, that it can never be made fruitful [and, therefore] [t]he husbandman is fain to let it alone, as an incurable piece of waste and worthless ground." 2 FLAVEL, supra note 19, at 173.
Scholars, for their part, have been more convinced that improvement of the waste lands rarely produced substantial results. Many such lands "only ever turned in relatively low Fall 2015] Surface Water Liability 87 B. Colonization and Exporting Land Improvement Philosophies
Land Improvement and Land Claiming
During Colonization
Ideas about land improvement served as cornerstones of the British colonization process. Moving hand-in-hand with planting as a primary British colonial strategy and justification for external territorial control, improvement policies and land attitudes traveled widely under British rule. When European powers disagreed about territorial claims, 78 the British appealed to possession 79 and, more specifically, to improvement of the land as justification for their claims. 80 British landowners imposed their system of land control, ownership, and valuation along with their related concept of improvement. British ideas of proper agricultural techniques, which were more entrenched after the evangelical literature of improvement, involved a categorization of certain lands as unproductive, even when those lands may have been agriculturally productive before colonization. 81 The very British idea of straight rows and fenced gardens was crucial to the colonization process. These agricultural techniques created visible changes to the landscape, creating tangible evidence of occupation and investments of labor that could be used to justify territorial claims vis-à-vis other European powers.
82 Additionally, the narrative of landscape changes allowed British colonists to argue the superiority of a labor investment in land over simple occupation, a yields," and as a result scholars have concluded "the assumption that, in general, enclosure of 'waste land' transformed large areas of unproductive land to fertile farmland is at best ques- 
84
British colonists knew how much labor and inhabitance produced visible and permanent evidence on the landscape. The degree of change from nature aligned with a precise hierarchy of civilization: "The garden is the highest state of cultivation; open fields and common pastures the lowest . . . ." 85 As the Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle explained in 1758, "Nothing is more certain than that men level forests, drain off waste waters, deepen the shallow currents of great rivers and in process of time give the earth a quite different face to that of countries uninhabited or but lately peopled." 86 The colonists believed that the "soil is always rich" when a swamp in North America was "cleared and drained," becoming "proper for the growth of rice, hemp, and indigo."
87 Such descriptions suggest that landscape changes provided the kind of evidence needed to prove longstanding habitation when foreign powers challenged British claims to land.
The British contrasted their own approach to colonization with that of the French. Rather than planning "to plant and settle," the French instead "erected military forts." 88 In the British view, "[w]hen any members of a civilized people leave their native land to settle in a waste, uncultivated country, the natural employment of these emigrants must be agriculture, and a confined sort of a commerce." 89 83.
The argument followed along these lines against native peoples:
For they account it a very just Cause of War, if any Nation will hinder others to come and possess a Part of their Soil, of which they make no use, but let it lie idle and uncultivated; since every Man has by the Law of Nature a right to such a 
Some may question why colonists would embark on such drainage projects, citing as counter-evidence the low population and large territorial expanse of North America. There are three potential answers. First, the British agricultural science of the time held that very good soil rested below those swampy waters. 96 Combined with the idea of drainage as a moral imperative, such "scientific" beliefs would explain the embrace of drainage on the new continent.
Second, relations with native peoples impacted the choice to drain in multiple ways. At the initial point of settlement, North America hardly abounded in empty land-archeological records suggest very substantial native populations. The idea of an empty and untouched North America sounds more in colonial politics than in historical accuracy. Scholars have long cited the "myth of emptiness" as part of the rhetoric of British colonization, which portrayed the Americas as "lack[ing] dense populations and productive land uses." 97 Third, for reasons of both security and transportation, 98 early settlements were concentrated along the coasts and tidal river areas. 99 Colonization struggled, probably in part because "[a] man not forced to leave his country, would not chose to . . . settle upon the low, flat, marshy sandy coast of the central colonies [.] " 100 The problem was that the "farther back the settlers went, the finer they found the country and climate, and the more fertile the soil; but then, they always lived in the hazard of war."
101 As a result, expansion to the wetlands that surrounded early settlements was more logical and less risky than expanding to areas further afield.
Finally, the areas that would have most lent themselves to cultivation would have been the fields long prepared by natives. 102 Colonists' initial
96.
See 1 HEWATT, supra note 42, at 81. 97.
Sluyter, supra note 81, at 412. For a discussion of colonial sources utilizing the emptiness argument and analysis of their rhetorical strategies see Tomlins, supra note 80, at 488.
98. Given the need to carry tools, water, and food to one's workplace for the day, British lands were traditionally best cultivated near settlements. Thus, "some part of their barest grounds . . . lieth so far from the town where unto it doth belong, that seldome, or never it is manured." ARTHUR STANDISH, NEW DIRECTIONS OF EXPERIENCE TO Surface Water Liability 91 expansions into the upland tended to be specifically to these native fields. 103 Such expansions, however, increased the likelihood of conflicts. Scholars have persuasively argued that competition over these prepared lands "lay at the heart of the genocidal warfare with surviving native peoples" throughout the seventeenth century. 104 This may have encouraged colonists to consider draining nearby wetlands as an alternative.
C. American Adoption of the British Improvement Philosophy
Once established, the British approach to land valuation and planning continued long beyond the colonial period. By 1791, the New York legislature found itself compelled to pass an Act requiring private landowners "to fill in, and raise the tract of land" known as "The Meadows" because "through the inattention of their owners" the lots had "become deep sunk holes, the receptacles of water in the rainy seasons, and the source of many unwholesome and noxious stenches." 105 The legislature decided the solution was to raise the lots as much as necessary "to convey into the East River all the water which shall from time to time fall on the said tract of land."
106
Draining lands and re-routing small streams continued throughout the nineteenth century and beyond, although the activity dwindled with the availability of more easily improved lands. The practices remained strong, though, in 1844 when Henry Hutchinson wrote his treatise explaining the many methods of draining lands and improving soils. 107 Hutchinson was cognizant from the first page that his treatise entered a rather robust genre, explaining "the Author is aware that a great deal has already been written upon the subject by men well qualified to judge the merits and value of draining."
108
Arising from the philosophy of improvement, the right to drain lands (and therefore to increase the volume of a watercourse) became standard within American property and nuisance law. As Thompson on Real Property explains, "As a general rule, the law allows landowners to discharge water into natural waterbodies as a means of draining the land. This right is recognized in the common law as well as in the statutes of many jurisdictions." , 1994) . There are few limitations to the right: "Such discharge may occur without liability where 1) the drainage results from the reasonable use of the land, 2) the waters are not diverted into water- 92 
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[Vol. 5:1 When improvement through drainage was successful, however, the natural consequence was the casting of surface waters onto other lands. 110 To foster a culture of land improvement, governments needed liability rules for surface water that fostered development. These rules are the dominant trend in American history concerning surface water. As the next part of this Article will explain, while some jurisdictions adopted outright rules to favor development, others instead modified their rules to adopt exceptions favoring development.
II. LIABILITY FOR SURFACE WATER
Traditionally, courts adopted one of two positions with respect to surface water liability. In their purest formulations, the two approachesknown as the common enemy doctrine and the civil law rule-are nearly opposites. 111 This part discusses each rule in its basic form and then proceeds to the many exceptions and variations that were adopted in response to modern circumstances. Before addressing these rules, however, it is critical to understand precisely what constitutes surface waters, as distinguished from watercourses.
A. Defining Surface Waters and Watercourses
The definition of surface waters is critical because surface waters are not far removed, in geographical terms, from watercourses, and courts have developed distinctive approaches for each. Surface water cases address runoff, from either ordinary or extraordinary precipitation, that moves from one property to another. Such waters move across the surface of the land, as opposed to within the water bodies. Water that moves within the water bodies, even when those overflow their usual bounds, is not surface water.
Because surface waters are defined in opposition to watercourses, it is helpful to consider the definition of a watercourse. One of the more elaborate explanations states, "To constitute a water course, it must appear that the water usually flows in a particular direction; and by a regular channel, having a bed with banks and sides . . . . It may sometimes be dry. It need not flow continuously; but it must have a well-defined and substantial exiscourses which would not have received the water naturally, and 3) the natural capacity of the watercourse is not exceeded." Id.
110. Thus, when one party engaged in "cutting ditches on his own land, contiguous to the water course, and making banks, and clearing and cultivating the land" in the occupation and use of his land, he "increased the quantity of water which flowed or run down the water course." Williams v. 
B. The Common Enemy Doctrine
As one of the oldest and originally most favored approaches to surface water liability, the common enemy doctrine dates to a line of Massachusetts cases from 1851, 1859, and 1865. 116 The common enemy rule is occasionally referred to as the "common law rule," 117 and it "apparently was adopted on the mistaken assumption that it represented the common law of England."
118 Some have speculated that the general idea of water as a common enemy may stem from the British approach to seawater. 119 What is clear is that American courts incorporated the British philosophy of land management by choosing liability rules that prioritized development. As we saw in the history of improvement, there is a long-standing British tradition of treating standing water as an enemy-as something that should be drained. As one writer explained, "when a Fen man has once gotten the water decently out of his own premises, he leaves his neighbor to guard for himself against its consequences."
120 British colonists and administrators imported this understanding of water as a common enemy to North America, where it flourished until it was embraced by Massachusetts courts. When the improvement of lands such as swamps and salt marshes was a key goal of society, the common enemy doctrine made a great deal of sense because it supported development. The doctrine continues to be the primary approach to surface water liability in some jurisdictions today.
121
The rule was, according to the last of the three Massachusetts cases, "the plaintiff and defendant, being conterminous proprietors, had each the right to develop, improve and enjoy his own estate; and if, as an incident to the exercise of this right, the estate of the other was injured, he would have no legal remedy for such injury." 122 In its purest form, the rule meant that "each landowner [could] deal with [surface water] in such manner as best suits his own convenience. Such sanctioned dealings include [d] walling it out, walling it in and diverting or accelerating its flow by any means whatever." 123 The common enemy doctrine holds that there is "no liability as arising, per se, merely from the obstruction, or diversion, of the natural drainage of surface water."
124 As the Maine Supreme Court put it, "any proprietor of land may control the flow of mere surface water over his own premises, according to his own wants and interests, without obligation to any proprietor either above or below." 125 Notably, once a court has adopted the common enemy doctrine (or the civil rule alternative), the court applies the chosen rule, no matter what the procedural posture of the case, i.e., whether it is brought in terms of enforcing an easement, a claim for trespass, or a claim of negligence or nuisance. As the Indiana Court of Appeals explained, "The common enemy doctrine may apply regardless of the form of action brought by the plaintiff, that is, regardless of whether the plaintiff asserts his claims as an action for negli- Surface Water Liability 95 gence, trespass, or nuisance." 126 The common enemy doctrine, therefore, remains a unique feature of water law applicable to causes of action arising in various circumstances, so long as the waters in question can accurately be described as surface waters.
There are a number of common exceptions to the doctrine, and several jurisdictions have adopted more than one of these exceptions. 127 One method of adopting the common enemy approach is to add meliorating language within the traditional rule by making reference to a reasonableness standard. For example, Minnesota notes, "Each possessor [of land] is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others." 128 The addition of the key qualifier some allows the court to incorporate a reasonableness tort standard to soften the traditional rule. Thus, in Minnesota, the landowner "incurs liability only when his harmful interference with the flow of surface water is unreasonable."
129 Similarly, California has determined that the particular protective measures adopted by the landowner must be reasonable.
130
Other jurisdictions have adopted the common enemy rule, but have softened its application with an exception for unnecessary injury. Arkansas courts, for example, have found that the right to expel surface waters is contingent on avoiding "unnecessary injury" to the neighbor. 131 There, the landowner responsible for increased water flow is not responsible "unless injury is unnecessarily inflicted upon another which, by reasonable effort and expense, could be avoided."
132
Courts have also blended the reasonableness qualification with a more general negligence approach for a further variation on the original rule. For example, in Missouri, "surface water may be treated as a common enemy and no liability attaches where the flow of surface water is obstructed, so long as it is done reasonably and not in a reckless or negligent manner." 133 In these jurisdictions, the case law tends to make much more frequent reference to traditional tort standards for determining liability. Negligence in- troduces a higher burden of proof than would otherwise be included if, for example, the problem of surface water were simply treated as a trespass.
Other jurisdictions have introduced a negligence concept without incorporating a reasonableness criterion. One example of such a rule instead incorporates a "due care" standard: "Under the common enemy doctrine, landowners who alter the flow of surface water are shielded from liability only if they exercise their rights with due care by acting in good faith and avoiding unnecessary damage to the property of others." 134 At other times, courts have made it clear that the adoption of the common enemy doctrine does not prevent application of the law of negligence. 135 Instead, the common enemy doctrine would simply provide one measure of the reasonableness of a landowner's actions when the jury is determining the standard of ordinary care. Additionally, negligence causes of action are sometimes incorporated by attacking the process of construction-i.e., by alleging that a bridge, levee, etc. was constructed negligently, thereby causing the additional risk of flooding.
136
The American Law Institute has adopted a similar view, looking for negligent, reckless, or ultra-hazardous conduct to support liability. 137 Additional rules apply where there is an intentional invasion. In those circumstances, the question is whether the invasion was reasonable. 138 Similarly, other jurisdictions have incorporated a good faith standard into their variation of the common enemy doctrine. In those jurisdictions, "[a] landowner will not be liable for damages to abutting property caused by the flow of surface water due to improvements to his or her land provided that the improvements were made in good faith to fit the property for some rational use."
139
While each of the exceptions or variations discussed thus far apply to the general rule, jurisdictions have also created exceptions that apply only to particular landscape features. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court declined to apply the rule where the surface water gathered naturally within a depression. 140 Additionally, courts embracing the common enemy doctrine have frequently adopted an exception specific to collecting and releasing surface Surface Water Liability 97 water such that it flows across neighboring lands. 141 One court stated, "The neighbor above cannot gather water in great quantities and put it off in a different place, but he is allowed to let it go as it would naturally go, whether it be a spring or the natural rain water that falls on the lot." 142 Similarly, Indiana has adopted the common enemy rule, but modified the rule to "not allow a landowner to 'collect or concentrate surface water and cast it, in a body, upon his [or her] neighbor.' " 143 In a related approach, some courts have also chosen not to favor defendants who "drained onto the other property by artificial means, such as pipes and ditches." 144 Courts have repeatedly considered whether, if the common enemy doctrine is adopted by a state, it should also extend to urban landscapes. More generally, nuisance law tends to be applied differently in urban and rural landscapes because of the importance of landscape context in determining the reasonableness of a landowner's actions.
C. The Civil Law Rule
The civil law rule is nicely summarized in a Louisiana case: "[T]he owner of land may do on his estate whatever he pleases subject to the limitation that he cannot cause his neighbor damage in so doing . . . ." Indeed, "the neighbor may be put to some inconvenience," but not so much as would "actually damage the adjoining property." 146 It is rare for a civil law rule to continue without modification.
147 Development pressures have allowed "the upper owner to make modifications in the drainage pattern and even to accelerate the flow of water so long as the changes are not substantial or do not unreasonably or negligently cause harm to the lower owner."
148 As this formulation suggests, courts have altered the rule by the introduction of a reasonableness or negligence standard, similar to the modifications of the common enemy doctrine. A common modern approach is that " [n] Courts have also modified the civil law rule through the addition of a good husbandry exception, which adds a particular inclination toward preferring development (or at least development that is arguably well executed). 150 As the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, this option is now quite popular.
D. The Reasonableness Rule
While some jurisdictions still formulate their approach to surface water liability in terms of the traditional doctrines (albeit often with qualifying language such as "some" or "reasonably"), other jurisdictions have completely replaced the traditional rules with a general rule of reasonableness. 152 The distinction is important. For example, in a civil law rule jurisdiction that has incorporated a reasonableness modification, the civil law rule still includes the idea of an easement on the lower-lying lands created by the natural flow of waters. 153 Any determination of what is reasonable in terms of new burdens for landowners will assume the preexisting burden of the easement. In contrast, a jurisdiction adopting a general reasonableness rule does not begin by assuming that burden on the lower lands. 
150.
See generally infra Subsection III.B.2. 151.
Garbarino, 330 P.2d at 31. 152.
As one court put it, a modern court has to decide whether to "adhere to the 'common enemy' doctrine in respect to surface waters, or abandon it in favor of the 'reasonable use' doctrine, as numerous other jurisdictions have done." State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Wis. 1974).
153.
As Thompson on Real Property explains, "Although the rule has been modified, the lower landowner is still considered to be burdened with a drainage easement in favor of the upper landowner and must receive the water." 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 50.20(g). 154.
Courts following the general approach simply refuse to recognize the "natural easement" postulated by the civil law rule. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that "[a]t common law there exists no easement or servitude in the premises of the lower landowner in favor of the owner of the higher land as to surface water which falls or accumulates by rain or the melting of snow. Courts may engage the question of liability without reference to either of the two traditional approaches to surface water where one party has embarked upon generally elevating its land to the detriment of a neighbor.
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In such circumstances, courts may apply rules specific to elevating or grading the landscape.
A large number of cases arise over the elevation of land, particularly within urban areas. Jurisdictions following the common enemy doctrine are split over whether the elevation of land should result in liability for surface water runoff. 158 Notably, courts are not only divided on whether an exception should be made for elevated land, but also whether the exception should apply equally in all types of landscapes (ranging from urban to rural to agricultural).
159
Before examining how the two traditional rules may apply to the elevation of land, it should be noted that not all courts adopt rules specific to these circumstances. Some courts address these cases within the context of the general approach to surface waters within their jurisdiction. 160 If the common enemy rule were applied strictly, there would be no liability for elevating one's parcel entirely. 161 On the other hand, if the civil law rule were applied, it is reasonably clear that the party elevating his or her land would likely be causing damage to the neighbor and therefore would be liable for those damages, provided they rose above mere inconvenience. 162. See 6 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 109, § 50.20(h). The lower owner was obligated to receive water from the upper owner and the upper owner, in turn, was obligated to neither increase the volume nor alter the flow of the water. While this rule was [Vol. 5:1 Rather than applying one of the two traditional rules, some courts consider the act of raising the land to the detriment of a neighbor to be an intentional tort. In Allen v. Morris Building Co., the Michigan Supreme Court explained, "Plaintiffs were not required to prove defendants were negligent or that their grading operations were in violation of city ordinance or other law."
163 What mattered to the court was "the invasion of [plaintiffs'] property rights . . . due to defendant's intentional or positive and continuous tort." 164 The defendants' conduct constituted an intentional tort because they "wilfully graded and built downspouts in the mentioned fashion" and such actions damaged the plaintiff. 165 Perhaps most commonly, courts have addressed the elevation of a parcel by applying a rule of natural flow. The natural flow rule requires that the lower parcel submit to the flow of water such as it naturally progresses through the landscape. 166 Alternatively stated, "the owner of land is entitled to have surface water flow naturally over the land of the lower land owner, and the lower owner cannot prevent escape of water from the higher land onto his land." 167 The justifications for the rule seem to fall at the conjunction of a natural law approach and a "buyer beware" theory. As the New York Court of Appeals explained in 1881, the primary considerations were of the "order of nature," which should not be subject to "unreasonable interruption."
168 Courts reasoned that due to the natural order of things, the lower-lying parcel must accept the runoff of surface waters. Notably, this meant that the plaintiff had no right of self-help either. 169 The higher-lying landowner had an affirmative right to divert waters "on the land of another only through depressions, draws, or other drainways as they were wont to flow in the state of nature. (Neb. 1962 ) ("This court has recognized the right of an upper proprietor to drain surface waters through a well-defined natural course, whether the course be ditch, swale, or drain in its primitive condition, and that such flow cannot be arrested or Fall 2015] Surface Water Liability
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The natural flow rule does not precisely align with either traditional approach to surface water liability. The natural flow approach roughly coordinates with the civil law rule, although the natural flow rule goes further in establishing the rights of the higher-elevated landowner by establishing something along the lines of an easement for the passage of water. 171 Indeed, at times courts have conceived of the natural flow approach as an easement-one created by the natural flow of waters meeting the criteria for an easement by prescription.
172 Thus, the natural flow of waters is often described using the vocabulary of easements: "The owner of the lower, or servient, estate must receive surface water from the upper, or dominant, estate, in its natural flow."
173 These terms, servient and dominant estates, describe the quintessential features of an easement in property law.
Most notably, the easement must "be acquired by an uninterrupted enjoyment" 174 for the statutory period provided within that jurisdiction-generally fifteen to twenty years. Because of this requirement, when the natural flow rule is adopted as an easement, such easements will correspond to the historically normal height of the water. Flooding beyond that level may still constitute a nuisance.
175
With respect to the common enemy doctrine, there is no priority for either the higher-lying or lower-lying parcel or the natural flow of waters. Under the strictest formulation of the common enemy doctrine, a landowner could repel surface waters and discharge them onto a neighboring parcel no matter the consequences to the neighbor. 176 For a lower elevated interfered with to the injury of neighboring proprietors."). There are, of course, limits to the natural flow rule as well: "[T]he upper owner has no right to increase materially the quantity or volume of water discharged on the lower landowner." Biberman, 58 A.2d at 671. 171. Some courts have explicitly connected the civil law rule with the establishment of an easement based on the natural flow of water. South Dakota, for example, describes the civil law rule, which it has adopted for rural surface water drainage, as creating "an easement under which the dominant, or upper property owner may reasonably discharge surface water over the servient estate through natural watercourses. [Vol. 5:1 landowner, this would mean that the common enemy doctrine directly contradicted the natural flow rule: the lower parcel would not be obligated to accept waters from above and could, without regard for the consequences, prevent the water from entering the parcel. One version of the natural flow rule adopts a negligence approach to determine whether one property owner exposed "others to an unreasonable risk of harm." 177 In Tennessee, for example, the plaintiff can only succeed under the natural flow rule by showing "not only that the defendant was guilty of negligence but that such negligence was one of the proximate causes of the injuries complained of." 178 Whether a court follows the general surface water rule or adopts a rule specific to parcels elevated through improvements, the court may also choose to vary the rule depending on whether the landscape context is urban or rural. Where courts have adopted the rule of natural flow to address parcel elevation, courts may choose not to apply the rule in the urban context. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court explained in 1897, "[w]hen you come to small lots in a city, laid out as this is, then the rule changes, and the party below is not bound to submit to that flow of water. He may dam it up." 179 Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals explained that the general rule was that "[t]he owner of a city lot is not, indeed, obliged to keep his ground at its natural or former level, and may turn back upon an adjoining lot water the natural inclination of which would be to run down upon his own lot." 180 The court was concerned with mediating the parties' needs in the context of fostering local development. Thus, the court explained, "The necessity of building is great, but no greater than the carrying on of many trades which tend to interfere with the comfort of those in whose vicinity they are carried on."
181 Thus, outside of urban centers, a lower landowner may protect himself from surface water by building a levee if doing so is a practical method of protecting against surface water, and if by constructing a levee, the lower proprietor acts in good faith and without negligence.
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In Illinois, where the natural flow rule is particularly important because it is applied to surface water cases more generally, there are multiple adaptations to provide for urban and rural contexts. Within rural lands, Illinois softens the rule for the enterprising farmer who protects his land from sur- To add to the confusion in dealing with surface waters, some courts have chosen to adopt both the traditional common enemy doctrine and the civil law rule, applying one for urban areas and the other for rural areas.
Ohio courts, for example, have utilized both rules, applying the common enemy doctrine to urban areas and the civil rule to rural areas. 185 To promote development within the city, courts have found it advisable to protect the investment of the owner who has chosen to divert the natural flow of water to protect his business. 186 Indeed, one Ohio judge went so far as to observe that "the plaintiff here could have taken the matter in his own hands, and could have cast said water back upon the defendant's land, and if he did so in a reasonable manner, the defendant company could not complain, or hold the plaintiff liable therefor." 187 Similarly, Kansas, which initially applied the common enemy doctrine, partially switched to the civil law rule. As the Kansas Supreme Court explained, "The act of 1911 . . . abolishing the common-law rule and substituting therefor the rule of the civil law with respect to surface waters applies only to lands used for agricultural purposes and highways lying wholly outside the limits of any incorporated city."
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In 1904, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to apply the previously adopted civil law rule in a new case, finding instead that "[t]he rule adopted in this State from the civil law, which in general makes land legally subservient to the natural flowage of surface water, does not apply under the artificial conditions created by the building of cities and the improvement of city lots." 189 As the court explained in 1974, "this court early took the position that the civil law rule should not apply in cities, but instead adopted the 'common enemy' doctrine for incorporated areas."
190
One reason for adopting different rules for urban and rural landscapes arises from the difficulty of determining the original natural flow. The problem is that "at least with respect to urban property where conditions are constantly changing," it can be "generally difficult or even impossible to establish how surface water flowed 'when untouched and undirected by the hand of man. ' " 191 Given how very different some urban landscapes are compared to their pre-urban existence (compare, for example, marshy Manhattan island and the current 5th Avenue), there is some merit to this explanation.
Other courts have considered and explicitly rejected maintaining distinct approaches to urban and rural lands. In Tennessee, for example, the Supreme Court explained, "We are unable to see any difference in principle between the reciprocal rights and duties of adjacent urban proprietors and those of adjacent rural proprietors."
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III. NAVIGATING SURFACE WATER LIABILITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
This final part addresses the need for reform. This need stems, to a large extent, from the tangle of rules that have evolved over the last century. Section III.A explains how, as a result of the proliferation of exceptions to the standard rules and the contextual adaptations of the rules, surface water liability has become rather difficult to navigate. This is problematic not only in terms of the complexity of the case law, which hampers public understanding of the rules, but also because liability has become unpredictable.
Section III.B tackles a more important reason why surface law needs reform. Current rules foster drainage and the destruction of wetlands, which contributes to climate change in multiple ways. Additionally, the destruction of wetlands exacerbates climate change related issues, such as storm surges and sea level rise. It is relatively easy to see how deeply the British approach to land management influenced the common enemy rule and how the common enemy rule fosters drainage. Other modern variations on that rule, however, are not necessarily any less problematic in terms of climate change. This section examines many of the modern rules and their Garland v. Aurin, 53 S.W. 940, 941 (Tenn. 1899). In another related variation, California has adopted the same rule for both urban and rural lands. However, courts have also said that the rule must be tailored to the particular landscape context within each case. Keys v. Romley, 412 P.2d 529, 535-36 (Cal. 1966). Fall 2015] Surface Water Liability 105 impacts on land management practices. This section argues that surface water rules carry with them a long history of a particular view of land-one deeply influenced by the British approach to land management, which emerged from contemporaneous agricultural science. Rather than re-examining our rules in light of changing scientific knowledge, we have allowed the weight of precedent to keep even scientifically outdated rules in place.
Finally, Section III.C proposes a new rule: a single rule of landscapespecific reasonableness. Such a rule would support the reasonable expectations of the landowner with respect to development, but could also advance the public good through maximizing sustainability when the most benefit can be gained at the least cost. Such a landscape-specific rule would favor development within areas that are already highly developed, while disfavoring development in landscapes that remain closer to their natural state. The point of such a rule would be to maximize economic opportunities where there are relatively few gains to be had from the landscape for climate health, but then maximize climate health where there are significant potential gains to be had from maintaining an entirely or largely undeveloped landscape. While acknowledging that surface water liability rules are not, of course, our only route to protecting wetlands or to managing land use, I argue that the case law implicates large-scale social issues that deserve thoughtful attention-attention that has often been paid in other property and tort contexts.
A. Complex Litigation and Complications from Pro-Development Influences
As a result of the proliferation of exceptions to the standard rules, and the contextual adaptations of the rules, there is a great deal of complexity to litigating a surface water liability case. Liability is, simply put, rather unpredictable. As the Indiana Supreme Court explained, the two original doctrines 
